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Abstract
In this paper, I develop a dynamic insider-outsider model in which a union of incum-
bent workers is called in to choose the wage of its members by taking into account the
optimal employment policy of firms that, in turn, are assumed to decide the firing rate
of insiders and the number of outsiders to hire. Under the assumption that incumbents
are able to observe their own productivity, the one of outsiders and the amount of labour
turnover costs paid by firms, I analytically show that the initial stock of insiders may
pin down an equilibrium in which the trajectories of incumbents, their own wage and the
firing rate are jointly determined and the proposition according to which insiders have
an incentive to keep their numbers small holds on a static and a dynamic perspective.
Moreover, I numerically show that in this setting insiders adjust their wage in order to
retain their positions and such a behaviour leads to asymmetric employment fluctuations
and a certain degree of wage stickiness.
JEL Classification: E24; E32; J31; J64.
Keywords: Insider-outsider theory; Union modeling; Wage and employment dynamics;
Optimal control.
1 Introduction
The insider-outsider theory of employment and unemployment rests on the assumption that
there is a fundamental asymmetry in wage setting process among incumbent workers (insiders)
and unemployed workers who are looking for a job (outsiders). On the one hand, relying on
labour turnover costs and/or firm-specific skills that create a productivity premium, insiders are
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draft of this work. The usual disclaimer applies.
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assumed to have a strong bargaining power in the wage setting process - sometimes strengthened
via formal or informal unions - and to exploit this power in order to maximize their pay and
foster their employment opportunities. On the other hand, outsiders are assumed to have no
market power and when they have the chance to find a job their wage is usually quite close to
the reservation level and they have no say over their employment prospects.
Undoubtedly, the main backers of the insider-outsider theory are Lindbeck and Snower
(1984, 1989) who developed a long array of works that uncover a wide range of consequences
in terms of wages and (un)employment triggered by the interest conflict between insiders and
outsiders in the labour market such as the existence and persistence of involuntary unem-
ployment, the inflexibility of insiders’ wage, trade union corporatism and the asymmetry of
wage-employment movements during recessions and expansions. Moreover, Carruth and Os-
wald (1987) provide a model of union behaviour grounded on the distinction between insider
and outsider workers and discuss some related macroeconomic implications.1 Furthermore,
Blanchard and Summers (1986) as well as Gottfries and Horn (1987) rely on insider-outsider
relations to explain the strong persistence of unemployment observed in Europe during the
80’s.
In the latest survey article dedicated to the theoretical approach that they contributed to
start, Lindbeck and Snower (2002) point out that one of the most complex and open question of
the insider-outsider theory is the way in which employment - and wages - moves through time
in response to labour market shocks. Specifically, while there is a number of insider-outsider
contributions that show how to fix the static levels of employment and wages at any point in
time, dynamic insider-outsider models - despite some fair exceptions - lag somehow behind.
Similarly, Sanfey (1995) argues that modifying traditional union models to take into account
the distinction between insiders and outsiders is straightforward, but that task is actually much
more complicated in dynamic models.
In confirmation of this argument, the dynamic insider-outsider literature counts a limited
set of contributions. For instance, Solow (1985) outlines a two-period insider-outsider model
but he is mainly concerned about what happens in the first and he does not derive any explicit
dynamic law for employment and wages.2 Drazen and Gottfries (1990) set forth a dynamic
optimizing insider-outsider framework developed over an infinite horizon, but they model the
evolution of wages and employment by means of few discrete realizations of the two variables.3
Huizinga and Schiantarelli (1992) develop a discrete-time model in which a firm and a union of
insiders efficiently bargain over the wage and employment but the two authors focus only on
1For instance, the possibility that productivity improvements can feed into pure wage increases for insiders
with no, or minor, effects on employment.
2Recognizing the inherent dynamic of the insider-outsider hypothesis, a similar exercise is carried out by
Vetter and Andersen (1994).
3Namely, high or low wages vis-a`-vis one or two slots of workers which are taken as proxies of low and high
employment.
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the path of employment adjustments driven by productivity shocks. Fukuda and Owen (2008)
build a series of overlapping-generations (OLG) models with human capital accumulation in
which the insider-outsider dichotomy is conveyed in terms of firm-specific versus general skills.4
More recently, Gal`ı (2016) sets forth a New Keynesian DSGE model with an insider-outsider
labour market and explores the implications of that environment for the design of monetary
policy.
To the best of my knowledge, the present contribution is the first attempt to provide a
stochastic dynamic insider-outsider model developed within an optimal control framework with
continuous time and infinite horizon. Specifically, I build a theoretical setting in which a union
of insider workers is called in to choose the wage of its members in an inter-temporal setting by
taking into account the optimal employment policy of firms that, in turn, are assumed to decide
the firing rate of insiders as well as the number of outsiders - or entrants - to hire in each instant.
In a partial equilibrium perspective, the dynamic interaction between the decisions of firms and
the ones of the union describes how wages and employment are continuously determined and
move through time in a typical insider-outsider economy subject to productivity shocks.
The results of this theoretical exploration can be summarized as follows. First, maintaining
the informational assumptions of textbook insider-outsider models, i.e., assuming that insiders
are actually able to observe their own productivity, the one of outsiders and the amount of
labour turnover costs borne by firms (cf. Lindbeck and Snower, 1989), the initial stock of
incumbent workers may pin down a well-defined equilibrium of the model economy in which
the dynamics of the insider labour force, its wage and the firing rate of incumbent workers
are jointly determined. Second, the proposition according to which insider workers have an
incentive to keep their numbers small holds on a static as well as on a dynamic perspective.
Moreover, relying on the outcome of some numerical simulations, it becomes possible to show
that in this model economy insiders adjust their wage in order to retain their positions and such
behaviour leads to asymmetric employment fluctuations and a certain degree of wage stickiness.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model. Section 3
provides some numerical simulations. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
I consider a model economy in which time is continuous and the time horizon is infinite. Within
this economy, in each instant, say t, a representative firm starts with a pool of LI (t) insider
workers. Those fully-fledged employees may randomly loose their job at the exogenously given
rate b. Moreover, the firm is assumed to be in the position to accelerate the outflow of seasoned
workers. Consequently, denoting newly hired workers - or entrants - by LE (t) and assuming that
4Different OLG models in which the insider-outsider distinction is concerned are given by McCausland (1998)
and Begg (1988).
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outsiders becomes insiders just immediately after their appointment, the dynamic evolution of
the stock of incumbent workers can be written as
·
LI (t) = LE (t)− (Φ (t) + b)LI (t) b > 0 (1)
where Φ (t) is the instantaneous firing rate decided by the firm.
The expression in (1) implicitly defines the way in which outsiders turn into insiders and it
reveals that when Φ (t) is higher than b, the firing decisions of the firm exacerbate the ‘normal’
labour market turnover. Moreover, when Φ (t) is equal to zero, the dynamics of incumbent
workers is completely determined by the decision to hire outsiders put forward by the firm.5
Similarly to Guerrazzi (2011), I assume that produced output is a stochastic quadratic com-
bination of the employed labour force. Therefore, under the hypothesis that the flow of entrants
is less productive than the stock of insiders, the production function of the representative firm
is given by
Y (t) = A (t) (LI (t) + φLE (t))−
α
2
(
L2I (t) + L
2
E (t)
)
0 < φ < 1, α > 0 (2)
where Y (t) is the level of output, A (t) is a productivity shock, φ measures the productivity
differential between insiders and outsiders while α is a parameter that conveys the slope of
labour demand.
The quadratic specification in eq. (2) has the virtue to deliver linear marginal productivity
schedules both for insiders and outsiders whose distance is proportional to the parameter φ.6
As argued by Lindbeck and Snower (1987), such a wedge between the productivity of the two
different categories of workers - together with labour turnover costs - provides a measure of the
degree of insiderness (cf. Manzini and Snower, 2002).
Denoting by wE the exogenously given reservation wage that has to be paid to outsider
workers, the picture of the marginal productivity of the two kind of workers implied by the
production function in eq. (2) is illustrated in figure 1.
5The existence of a positive job destruction rate for incumbent workers is a prerequisite for (1) to have a
stationary solution in which both LI (t) and LE (t) are positive and constant over time.
6This can be straightforwardly verified by differencing Y (t), respectively, with respect to LI (t) and LE (t).
4
EI
wtw ),(
)(),( tLtL
EI
)(tA
maxLmin
L
E
w
øA(t)
øA(t)/α A(t)/α
Figure 1: Marginal productivity of insiders and outsiders
The diagram in figure 1 illustrates, respectively, the marginal productivity of insiders and
outsiders. In details, the former crosses wE in Lmax, the latter in Lmin. The exogeneity of
the reservation wage is the feature that identifies this setting as a partial equilibrium model
(e.g. Huizinga and Schiantarelli, 1992). In the remainder of the paper, I will assume that the
information conveyed by the two linear schedules is common knowledge both for workers and
the firm.
Productivity disturbances evolve over time in a way that is known both by the firm and
the workers. Formally speaking, supply shocks are assumed to follow an Ornstein-Uhlnebeck
process. Consequently, the dynamics of A is given by
·
A (t) = κ (µA − A (t)) + σA
·
x κ > 0, µA > 0, σA > 0 (3)
where κ is the mean reversion rate, µA is the long-run mean of the process, σA is its instan-
taneous standard deviation while
·
x is a standard Brownian motion with zero drift and unit
variance (cf. Cox and Miller, 1967).
Insiders workers are assumed to be organized in an internal labour union whose task is to
set the real wage of its members by taking into account the hiring and firing decisions of the
firm.7 Similarly with Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981), I will assume that the preferences of the
union are given by a Stone-Geary utility function in which the reference values for the insider
labour force and the insider wage are both set to zero. Therefore, the union of insider workers
will have the following Cobb-Douglas objective function:
U (LI (t) , wI (t)) ≡ (LI (t))
β (wI (t))
1−β 0 < β < 1 (4)
where β (1− β) measures the relative weight of employment (wage) in the union preferences.
7As argued by Drazen and Gottfries (1990), one may think of a union which organizes an industry and that
is large relative to firms in that industry.
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Eq. (4) implies that the union suffers a loss (experiences a gain) when the firm decides to
reduce (increase) the stock of incumbent workers. Furthermore, the expression in (4) straight-
forwardly reveals that the welfare of outsiders is given no weight in the preferences of the
wage-setting union.
In what follows, I develop the dynamic problem of the firm and the one of the union.
Moreover, I discuss the existence of a stationary solution for both problems and I explore the
dynamics of the model economy in the neighbourhood of that stable allocation.
2.1 The problem of the firm
Consistently with Solow (1985), the representative risk-neutral firm is assumed to maximize
the discounted flow of its expected profit by taking the trajectory of the insider wages as given
but - at the same time - considering that its hiring and firing decisions have an impact on the
dynamics of incumbent workers, i.e., on the evolution of union’s membership. Consequently,
omitting the functional dependence of variables on time, the problem of the firm can be written
as
max
Φ,LE
+∞∫
t=0
exp (−ρt) (Y − wILI − wELE − ΦLIF ) dt ρ > 0
s.to
·
LI = LE − (Φ + b)LI
LI (0) = LI
(5)
where ρ is the discount rate, F are firing costs while LI is the initial number of insider workers.
In the subsequent analysis, I will make two assumption about firing cost. First, F is
quadratic with respect to the outflow of incumbent workers decided by the firm. The underlying
idea behind this hypothesis is that firing costs - associated with strikes, work-to-rule and union
litigations - increase more than proportionally with respect to the outflow of insiders (cf. Cooper
and Willis, 2009). Moreover, F is assumed to be directly proportional to the insider wage.
Consequently, I will consider the following expression:
F =
1
2
ΦLIwI (6)
As far as the production function in (2) and firing costs in (6) are concerned, the first-order
conditions (FOCs) for the problem in (5) are given by
ΦLIwI + Λ = 0 (7)
Aφ− αLE − wE + Λ = 0 (8)
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·Λ = αLI − A+ wI + Φ
2wILI + Λ (Φ + b+ ρ) (9)
lim
t→+∞
exp (−ρt) ΛLI = 0 (10)
where Λ is the costate variable on the dynamic constraint describing the evolution of insider
workers.
Eq.s (7) and (8) are, respectively, the FOC with respect to Φ and LE. Moreover, the differ-
ential equation in (9) describes the optimal path of Λ, whereas (10) is the required transversality
condition.
The results in eq.s (7) and (8) straightforwardly lead to
wI =
Aφ− αLE − wE
ΦLI
(11)
Eq. (11) is a trivial manipulation of the FOCS with respect to Φ and LE and it has two
important implications. First, from an economic point of view it implies that, everything else
being equal, the firm is willing to pay an insider wage that increases (decreases) as the size of
incumbent workers decreases (increases). Therefore, according to the optimal hiring and firing
decisions of the firm, insider workers gain from keeping their numbers small; indeed; as argued
by Solow (1985), a large number of insiders increases the union utility loss driven by an increase
of the firing rate and decreases the magnitude of wI .
Moreover, from an analytical point of view, eq. (11) implies that for given values of wI ,
Φ, wE, A and LI is also given the value of LE. Consequently, the problem of the firm can be
developed by focousing on one control only. Specifically, in the remainder of the paper, I will
describe the solution of the firm problem in terms of the implied trajectories for the firing rate
and the stock of insider workers.
Exploiting the results in (7) − (9) and assuming that the firm actually knows the process
that drives productivity shocks, the rates of growth of LI and Φ can be written, respectively,
as
·
LI
LI
=
Aφ− wE − Φ ((α + wI)− αb)LI
αLI
(12)
·
Φ
Φ
=
A− αLI − wI + ΦLIwI (b+ ρ)
ΦLIwI
−
·
LI
LI
(13)
Given the initial value of LI and the trajectory of wI , the solution of the firm problem
conveyed by eq.s (12) and (13) pins down the evolution of the insider labour force and the
path of the firing rate that convey the optimal employment strategy of the representative firm.
Therefore, in order to close the model, we have to find a way to link the trajectory of wI to the
endogenous - and exogenous - variables entering the two expressions above.
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2.2 The problem of the union
Continuing the analogy with Solow (1985), the union of insider workers is assumed to set the
wage of its members by taking into account that its membership dynamics is influenced by
firm’s hiring and firing decisions described above. Consequently, under the assumptions that
(i) the union discounts utility at the same rate that the firm uses to discount profit and (ii),
the union knows how the firm’s makes its decision about the hiring of outsiders, the problem
of the union is given by
max
wI
+∞∫
t=0
exp (−ρt)LβIw
1−β
I dt
s.to
·
LI =
Aφ−wE
α
−
(
Φ(α+wI)+αb
α
)
LI
LI (0) = LI
(14)
One may argue that the union of insider workers should set the wage of its members by
taking into account also the dynamics of the firing rate. However, such an addition in the union
problem would lead to two distinct inconsistencies. First, from a theoretical point of view, the
assumption that the union set the insider wage by considering the effects of its choices on
the firing rate is at odds with observation that in bad times outflows from employment are
exacerbated and a substantial number of insiders may actually loose their positions.8
Moreover, from an analytical point of view, the inclusion of
·
Φ among the dynamic constraints
of the union problem requires the existence of an initial value for the firing rate. However,
according to the expressions in (5), such an initial value is a jump variable of the firm problem
whose existence would call for the definition of a trajectory for the insider wage. Therefore, I
will assume that union set the wage by considering how the decision of the firm to hire outsiders
is affect by its wage policy, the level of the reservation wage and labour turnover costs.9
The FOCs for the problem in (14) are given by
(1− β)
(
LI
wI
)β
− Γ
ΦLI
α
= 0 (15)
·
Γ = Γ
(
Φ
(
α + wI
α
)
+ b+ ρ
)
− β
(
wI
LI
)1−β
(16)
8The underlying assumption is that insiders cannot adopt a wage strategy that guarantees a firing rate equal
to zero.
9In other words, the only piece of information required by the union to solve its problem is how the insider
wage affects the evolution of the state variable of the firm problem. As conveyed by eq. (11), this amounts
to assume that the union is able to observe the marginal productivity for insiders and outsiders as well as the
amount of marginal firing costs paid by the firm.
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lim
t→+∞
exp (−ρt) ΓLI = 0 (17)
where Γ is the costate variable on the dynamic constraint describing the evolution of union
membership.
Eq. (15) is the FOC with respect to wI . Moreover, the differential equation in (16) defines
the optimal path of Γ, whereas (17) is the required transversality condition.
Exploiting the results in (15) and (16), the growth rate of the insider wage can be written
as
·
wI
wI
=
ΦwI − (1− β) (Φ (α + wI) + α (b+ ρ))
α (1− β)
−
1− β
β
·
LI
LI
(18)
The expression in (18) reveals that rate of growth of the insider labour force spills over with a
negative sign into the dynamics of wI . Consequently, the incentive of insider workers of keeping
their numbers small holds also on a dynamic perspective. In other words, the dynamic concern
about the evolution of the insider labour force motivates the union to set a wage trajectory
that limits the expansion of its members.10
Given the initial value of LI , the solution of the union problem pins down the optimal
trajectory of the insider wage by taking into account the way in which its membership dynamics
is influenced by the optimal employment policy of the firm. Therefore, for any given value of the
initial insider workforce, the expressions in (3), (12), (13) and (18) describe the whole dynamics
of the model economy.
2.3 Steady-states
Within the model under investigation steady-state equilibria are defined as the set of terns
{w∗I ,Φ
∗, L∗I} such that
·
wI =
·
Φ =
·
LI =
·
A = 0. The elements of this set collect allocations in
which the insider wage is stable over time and in each instant the number of hired outsiders
is equal to the number of fired insiders. From a formal point of view, their derivation can be
made in three simple steps. First, setting
·
LI = 0 and
·
A = 0, respectively, in (3) and (12), the
steady-state equilibrium of the insider labour force can be conveyed as
L∗I =
µAφ− wE
Φ∗ (α + w∗I ) + αb
(19)
The expression in (19) reveals that when the long-run marginal productivity of outsiders is
equal to the reservation wage, the steady-state insider workforce becomes equal to zero. Conse-
10From a formal point of view, this result is related to the fact that the union does not have a reference value
for the wage entering its preferences. Whenever a wage reference is taken into account, the sign of the spillover
of union membership into the insider wage dynamics also depends on the degree of wage orientation of the
union, i.e., on the point size of the parameter β.
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quently, the existence of a positive value of L∗I requires that he long-run marginal productivity
of outsiders is higher than their wage.11
Second, setting
·
Φ = 0 and
·
A = 0, respectively, in (3) and (13), and plugging the result in
(19) allows to write the steady-state firing rate as
Φ∗ =
α (µAφ− wE − b (µA − w
∗
I ))
(α + w∗I ) (µA − w
∗
I ) + (µAφ− wE)w
∗
I (b+ ρ)
(20)
Eq. (20) states that when the long-run marginal productivity of outsiders and insiders is
equal, respectively, to the reservation wage and the equilibrium insider wage, the steady-state
firing rate becomes indeterminate.
Furthermore, setting
·
wI = 0 in (18) and plugging the results in (19) and (20) allows to
derive an equation in which the only unknown is the steady-state value of the insider wage.
Specifically,
αµA + γ0w
∗
I − (w
∗
I )
2
µA (φ− b)− wE + bw∗I
= −
α (1− β) + w∗I (1− 2β)
(1− β) (b+ ρ)
(21)
where γ0 ≡ (µAφ− wE) (b+ ρ) + µA − α.
On the one hand, the expression on the LHS of (21) is a reverse-u-shaped function of w∗I
whose roots are, respectively, P0 ≡ 1/2
(
γ0 −
√
γ20 + 4αµA
)
and P1 ≡ 1/2
(
γ0 +
√
γ20 + 4αµA
)
,
whereas its vertical intercept is equal to P2 ≡ αµA (µA (φ− b)− wE)
−1. On the other hand, the
expression on RHS is a linear function of w∗I whose root (slope) is equal toQ0 ≡ −α (1− β) (1− 2β)
−1(
δ ≡ − (1− 2β) ((1− β) (b+ ρ))−1
)
.
Since unions usually assumed to be more employment-oriented than wage oriented (e.g.
Sanfey, 1995), i.e., β > 1/2, the linear function on the RHS of (21) should have a positive
slope and a positive (negative) horizontal (vertical) intercept equal to Q0 (Q1 ≡ −α/ (b+ ρ)).
Consequently, selecting a suitable values for µA, φ, b and wE, eq. (21) admits a positive
solution for the steady-state insider wage. Thereafter, once w∗I is given, eq.s (19) and (20)
allow to retrieve, respectively, the steady-state values for the insider workforce and the firing
rate. The steady-state solution for wI is illustrated in figure 2.
11This is a sign of the inefficiency of the steady-state equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Steady-state
The diagram in figure 2 - together with eq.s (20) and (21) - shows that, everything else
being equal, the higher (lower) the value of long-run productivity, i.e., the higher (lower) µA,
the higher (lower) the steady-state values of the insider wage and the lower (higher) the firing
rate. Moreover, since the steady-state values for the insider wage and the firing rate tend to
move in opposite direction, eq. (19) reveals that the effects of long-run productivity movements
on the steady-state value of union membership remain analytically uncertain.
2.4 Local dynamics
Taking into account the tern {w∗I ,Φ
∗, L∗I} derived above, the local dynamics of the model
economy is described by the following linear 3× 3 system:


·
wI
·
Φ
·
LI

 =


j1,1 j1,2
w∗
I
(1−β)(µAφ−wE)
αβ(L∗I)
2
α(αL∗I−µA)+(Φ∗w∗I)
2
L∗
I
αL∗
I(w∗I)
2
α(b+ρ)+Φ(α+wI)
α
j2,3
−
Φ∗L∗
I
α
−
L∗
I(α+w∗I)
α
−
Φ∗(α+w∗I)+αb
α




wI − w
∗
I
Φ− Φ∗
LI − L
∗
I

 (22)
where the two unspecified elements of the Jacobian matrix (J) are given, respectively, by
j1,1 ≡
βΦ∗w∗I (1 + β)− (1− β) (Φ
∗ (α + w∗I ) + α (b+ ρ))
αβ (1− β)
(23)
j1,2 ≡
w∗I (w
∗
I − (α + w
∗
I ) (1− β))
α (1− β)
(24)
j2,3 ≡
α (w∗I − µA) + w
∗
IΦ
∗ (µAφ− wE)
αw∗I (L
∗
I)
2 (25)
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Considering a situation in which all the endogenous variables of the model economy have a
positive stationary solution and taking appropriate values for µA, φ and wE, it become possible
to state that the steady-state allocation {w∗I ,Φ
∗, L∗I} is a saddle-point.
12 In this case, there is
only one trajectory that satisfies (12), (13) and (18) which converges to the steady state while
all the others diverge. In other words, in the proposed dynamic insider-outsider model the
equilibrium path is locally determinate, i.e., taking a given initial value of the insider labour
force
(
LI
)
, there is a unique vector
[
Φ(0) wI (0)
]
in the neighbourhood of {Φ∗, w∗I} that
generates a trajectory converging to {w∗I ,Φ
∗, L∗I}. Specifically, the values of Φ(0) and wI (0)
should be selected to satisfy the transversality conditions in (10) and (17) by placing the system
of (12), (13) and (18) exactly on the stable branch of the saddle point {w∗I ,Φ
∗, L∗I}.
In the remainder of the paper, the stable saddle path followed by wI , Φ, LI and, implicitly,
by LE, is taken as the perfect-foresight - or rational expectations - path of the model economy.
3 Quantitative implications of the model
In order to offer a quantitative assessment of the dynamic insider-outsider model developed in
the previous section, now I resort to some numerical simulations. Consequently, I provide a
suitable calibration of the model economy. Thereafter, I derive the optimal trajectories for wI ,
Φ, LI and LE generated by the linear dynamic system in (22) when productivity disturbances
evolve according to the stochastic process in (3).13
3.1 Calibration
Following Eckstein et al. (2006), I map the period of the model economy into monthly figures
over a typical 50 years horizon, i.e., the recurrent time span explored in business cycles analysis
(e.g. Shimer, 2005). Thereafter, for reasons of data availability, the model is calibrated by
taking as reference the US economy.14
Specifically, the slope of labour demand is calibrated by means of the value of the labour
share provided by Kydland and Prescott (1982).15 The value of the discount rate is taken from
Giammarioli (2003). The separation rate is set by adjusting on a monthly base the JOLT-based
quarterly estimations retrieved by Shimer (2005). The productivity differential between insiders
and outsiders is fixed according to the US union wage premium estimated by Blanchflower and
12It would be possible to show that µA, φ and wE are bifurcation parameters for the linear system in (22);
indeed, the sign of j1,3 and j2,3 is strictly related to the magnitude of those parameters. Technical details are
available from the authors upon request.
13MATLAB codes are available from the author upon request.
14The applicability of the insider-outsider theory to the US labour market is explicitly acknowledged by Solow
(1985) and Lindbeck and Snower (2002).
15The hypothesis underlying the calibration of α is that the production function in (2) can be seen as the
integration outcome of log-linear demand schedules for insiders and outsiders.
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Bryson (2004). The figure of the reservation wage is obtained by combining the mentioned
value of the labour share with the point estimation of the US replacement rate provided by van
Vliet and Caminada (2012). Union’s employment weight is fixed according to the estimates of
Pencavel (1985). The value of long-run productivity is calibrated in order to replicate the long-
run US employment rate. The productivity reversion rate is fixed at the value of the negative
root of the system in (22) that generates the saddle path converging towards {w∗I ,Φ
∗, L∗I}.
Finally, the productivity variance is set in order to mimic the out-of-trend fluctuations of TFP
retrieved by Fernald (2012).
The whole set of parameter values and their respective description is given in table 1.
PARAMETER DESCRIPTION VALUE
b Separation rate 0.0250
ρ Discount rate 0.0300
φ Productivity differential 0.8300
α Labour demand slope 0.6400
wE Reservation wage 0.3648
µA Long-run productivity 1.1610
β Union’s employment weight 0.6490
κ Productivity reversion rate −1.1775
σA Productivity variance 0.0085
Table 1: Calibration
The parameter values in table 1 lead to the following steady-state references: w∗I = 0.8395,
Φ∗ = 0.7512, L∗I = 0.6816 and L
∗
E = 0.2640. Those figures implies that the suggested calibration
delivers a the picture of a labour market in which more than 70% of workers are unionized.
Interestingly, this membership ratio is fairly close to the one actually prevailing in the US postal
services over the last 30 years (cf. Hirsh and Macpherson, 2016).
3.2 The dynamics of wI, Φ, LI and LE
Exploiting the parameters values in table 1, the implied trajectories of wI , Φ, LI and LE are
plotted in the four panels of figure 3 while some descriptive statistics are given in table 2.16
16Initial conditions are set at the values implied by deterministic steady-state values for A and LI . Moreover,
in order to mitigate the effect of initial conditions on the first stage of the simulation process, similarly to Shimer
(2005), artificial series are derived by throwing away the first 1, 000 replications.
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Figure 3: Fluctuations driven by productivity shocks
(% deviations from steady-state values)
A wI Φ LI LE
Standard deviation 0.0074 0.0013 0.0118 0.0011 0.0259
Autocorrelation 0.1017 0.0803 0.1032 0.0144 0.1041
A 1 0.9633 −0.9984 0.6444 0.9824
wI − 1 −0.9473 0.8219 0.8992
Correlation matrix Φ − − 1 −0.6005 −0.9914
LI − − − 1 0.4919
LE − − − − 1
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
(Logarithmic deviations from steady-state values)
The diagrams in figure 3 and the estimates in table 2 allow to draw the following conclusions.
First, a positive (negative) productivity shock leads to an increase (decrease) in the insider wage,
in the number of incumbent workers and in the number of entrants. By contrast, a positive
(negative) productivity shock leads to a reduction (increase) of the firing rate of insiders.
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Second, the theoretical framework developed in section 2 conveys a certain degree of wage
stickiness; indeed, with the exception of the stock of incumbents, the amplitude of the insider
wage fluctuations is definitely smaller with respect to the one of other concerned variables.17
By contrast, the more volatile variable is the number of hired outsiders. This latter finding
suggests that in this setting employment adjustments in expansions and recessions tend mainly
to involve non-unionized workers (cf. Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2000).
Moreover, the fluctuations of insider labour force around the steady-state solution implied
by the parameter values in table 1 display a clear asymmetric pattern. This result is at odds
with the findings of Hizinga and Schiantarelli (1992) who argue that a partial equilibrium
insider-outsider model in which the reservation wage is exogenous should be unable to generate
asymmetries in the way in which employment adjusts in expansions and recessions.
Actually, the argument put forward by Hizinga and Schiantarelli (1992) holds whenever
the firing rate is taken as given. However, as far as the interaction between the firing rate
and the other variables usually enclosed in a dynamic insider-outsider model is recognized, the
realization of asymmetric employment adjustments becomes a real possibility. An explanation
of this pattern can be provided by analyzing in details the effects driven by productivity shocks
on wI , Φ and LI . As as I argued above, a productivity improvement leads to an increase of
the insider wage and a reduction of the firing rate. The latter reduction is the channel that
allows the insider workforce expansion. By contrast, a negative productivity shock leads to an
increase of the firing rate. In this case, insiders will find in their best interest to adjust their
wage downwards in order to offset the consequent contraction of the insider workforce.
More in general, regarding the different movements of the insider labour force after pos-
itive and negative productivity shocks, it is possible to conclude that in the model economy
developed in section 2, insider workers tend to adjust their wage setting policy in the attempt
to influence the hiring and firing decisions of the firm and retain their positions. In this way,
upwards employment adjustments occurring during expansions result in being definitely more
pronounced than downwards adjustments during recessions (cf. Begg at al., 1989; Gal`ı, 2016).
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I develop a dynamic insider-outsider model grounded on optimal control tech-
niques. Specifically, considering a situation in which time continuous and it extends over an
infinite horizon, I set forth an inter-temporal framework in which a union of insiders is called in
to choose the trajectory of the wage of its members by taking into account the optimal hiring
policy of firms that, in turn, are assumed to decide the firing rate of insiders as well as the
number of outsiders to hire.
17The relative rigidity of wages is a well-know feature of business cycles (e.g. Shimer, 2005; Ravn and
Simonelli, 2007).
15
Preserving the informational requirements of textbook insider-outsider models, i.e., under
the assumption that insiders are able to observe their own productivity, the one of outsiders and
the labour turnover cost paid by the firms (cf. Lindbeck and Snower, 1989), the implementation
of the maximum principle reveals that within this framework the initial stock of incumbents
may well pin down an equilibrium of the model economy in which the trajectories of the insider
labour force, the insider wage and the firing rate are jointly determined in a well defined manner.
Moreover, analyzing the FOCs of the model and the dynamics of the insider wage, I show
that the proposition according to which incumbents have an incentive to keep their numbers
small holds both on static dynamic terms. Furthermore, relying on the outcome of a set of
numerical simulations, I show that within this model economy insiders tend to adjust their
wage in order to retain their positions and such a behaviour leads to asymmetric employment
adjustments and wage stickiness even in a partial equilibrium perspective (cf. Begg at al., 1989;
Hizinga and Schiantarelli, 1992; Gal`ı, 2016).
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